Moraliteit, die opdringerige en die voorwaardelike

Abstract

Morality, the obtrusive and the conditional

The secularist (immanentist), historicist and pluralistic nature of current thinking disables the articulation of transcendental conditions for morality. It is ostensibly especially the constancy of a structure for morality, as transcendental condition, for morality that is disputable. However, an aggressive immanentism sees to it that a transcendent origin for morality does not even appear on the agenda of late modern thinkers, which makes the latter probably an equally serious marginalisation of transcendental considerations. In this article the (sometimes unconscious) experience of some philosophers that a constant structure for morality obtrudes itself upon us, is highlighted. A further claim is that a similar obtrusion can be observed about a coherent diversity of moral sources (i.e. sources which find themselves in a transcendental position with regard to each other). The “most daring” argument is for a transcendental transcendent origin for morality.