Original Research

Epistemiese waardes in die rasionaliteitsmodel van Wentzel van Huyssteen

Jaco Kruger
Koers - Bulletin for Christian Scholarship/Bulletin vir Christelike Wetenskap | Vol 62, No 1 | a553 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.4102/koers.v62i1.553 | © 1997 Jaco Kruger | This work is licensed under CC Attribution 4.0
Submitted: 07 January 1997 | Published: 10 January 1997

About the author(s)

Jaco Kruger, Departement Filosofie Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir CHO POTCHEFSTROOM

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Abstract

In his dialogue with the current state of the debate on philosophy of debate, Wentzel van Huyssteen develops what he calls a postfoundationalist model of rationality as opposed to the discredited foundationalist model and the, for him equally unacceptable, antifoundationalist model of rationality. In this article it is argued that the two basic epistemic values of Van Huyssteen's model, viz. the pursuit of intelligibility and the concept of critical realism, tie in with his opposition to foundationalism and antifoundationalism. He uses the concept of intelligibility to distance himself from a foundationalist approach, and then he utilizes the concept of critical realism to safeguard himself from antifoundationalism. The factor which ties these two values together is the notion of progress in science. In this article it is argued that Van Huyssteen’s model does not really succeed in transcending the foundationalism-antifoundationalism tension with a radically new alternative, the main reason for this being that a pragmatic idea of progress in science cannot succeed in integrally connecting the epistemic values of intelligibility and realism.

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